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Abstract
This paper studies five mergers in the European wireless telecommunication indus-
try and analyzes their impact on prices and capital expenditures of both merg-
ing carriers and their rivals. We find substantial heterogeneity in the relationship 
between increases in concentration and carriers’ prices. The specifics of each merger 
case clearly matter. Moreover, we find a positive correlation between the price and 
the investment effect; when the prices after a merger increase (decrease), the invest-
ments increase (decrease) too. Thus, we document a trade-off between static and 
dynamic efficiency of mergers.
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1 Introduction
Market structure has an important effect on the static and dynamic efficiency of mar-
kets. A standard microeconomic argument suggests that a more competitive market 
puts more pressure on firms to exploit ways to reduce production costs and increase 
efficiency. Firms will face low profits and therefore will try to “escape competition” 
(Aghion et al. 2005) by reducing their cost of production. However, the incentives 
to invest will not only affect static efficiency (in the form of lower prices), but also 
dynamic efficiency (in the form of increased investment in long-term improve-
ments). In concentrated markets, mergers and acquisitions will affect market struc-
ture significantly. Consequently, the behavior of firms may well change as a result of 
a merger in the industry, both for the merging and the non-merging firms. Hence, we 
study whether and how indicators of static and dynamic efficiency are affected by a 
merger in the industry.
Therefore, the core questions that we ask in this paper are whether within-market 
mergers have led to increased static and/or dynamic efficiency, and whether there is 
a tradeoff between the two. The answers to these questions will be relevant both to 
policymakers and to firms that operate within such industries.1 Policymakers will 
pursue dual goals of static and dynamic efficiency, but may place different weights 
on either. Further, firms that operate in technologically intensive industries may 
incorporate the expected short- and long-term effects of mergers on their own and 
their rivals’ efficiency in their decisions to merge.
At the time that this article was written, a four-to-three merger in the US wireless 
telecom market was being scrutinized by the regulators. The proposed deal2 involves 
T-Mobile US and Sprint: which are the two smallest carriers on the market, with 
the respective market shares of 16% and 12% and with the combined market share 
still falling behind those of the two biggest players, AT&T and Verizon. The previ-
ous attempts by the same operators, as well as an earlier bid by AT&T to acquire 
T-Mobile, failed, as the regulators feared it would lead to higher prices for consum-
ers. The new bid is defended on the grounds that the merged entity pledges to invest 
at least USD 40 billion and to build a 5G network faster than the other two competi-
tors, which requires combining the spectrum assets of both carriers. This highlights 
the trade-off between higher prices (market power effect) and higher quality (invest-
ment effect), which is considered in this article, and the relevance of our findings for 
the competition policy.
We study these issues in the wireless telecoms sector in Europe. The markets in 
this sector can be characterized as still national in scope. They display large market 
concentration, and are in need of large sunk investments. This is a useful setting 
1 Williamson (1968) was one of the first to consider the trade-off between higher prices and efficiencies 
that are faced by a regulator when reviewing a merger, and thus to emphasize the role of economies as a 
merger defense.
2 See “T-Mobile and Sprint chivvy regulators to bless their merger” in The Economist, May 3, 2018: 
https ://www.econo mist.com/busin ess/2018/05/03/t-mobil e-and-sprin t-chivv y-regul ators -to-bless -their 
-merge r.
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because market definition and identification of market participants are easy, and 
because there have been a series of important mergers in different countries that we 
observe. Moreover, the telecoms sector is an important part of most advanced econ-
omies, both for its direct effect of economic growth, but also for its general purpose 
technology characteristics (Röller and Waverman 2001; Czernich et al. 2011).
In addition, the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies is especially rel-
evant in an industry with significant technological progress, both in terms of infra-
structure and in terms of services. A Merrill Lynch report mentions that carriers are 
being pushed “to seek efficiencies in many areas: network construction and opera-
tion (via network sharing and outsourcing), marketing and distribution (via simpli-
fied, SIM-only rate plans) and product/development/support (by de-emphasizing 
walled garden content and services). These trends are being furthered by technology 
(smarter smartphones that reduce the need for specialized carrier-provided content) 
and regulation (pushing carriers to de-emphasize early termination fees).”3
The conventional approach for studying the effects of mergers on firm behav-
ior is a cross-country study that compares markets with mergers to those without 
a merger. Such studies are informative, but they have several weaknesses: First, a 
comparison of markets with and markets without mergers may mask several aspects 
and could, for example, interpret ex-ante heterogeneity across markets that affects 
the likelihood of mergers as causal drivers of efficiency increases ex-post: follow-
ing a merger. Second, obtaining one average effect of mergers across countries may 
be misleading if there is substantial heterogeneity of effects across countries. Even 
within countries, the merging firms and the rival firms may react differently to a 
merger.
We therefore choose a multiple-single-case approach: We study five mergers in 
four European countries that increased market concentration considerably4 and we 
examine the effects of mergers on two outcomes: prices as a measure of static effi-
ciency, which is determined by the current firm’s market power and costs; and capi-
tal expenditures as a measure of the firms’ investment incentives. While we have 
no way of statistically comparing the five cases, we see interesting patterns: In two 
of the five cases, the effect on static efficiency is positive; in two, it is negative (in 
one it is insignificant); but in nearly all scenarios, the merging as well as rival firms’ 
prices moved mostly in the same direction.
Moreover, we find a positive correlation between the price and the investment 
effects. In the markets with an increase in price (i.e., a decline in static efficiency), 
all firms reported an increase in capital expenditure, which suggests a stronger focus 
on dynamic efficiency; the opposite effect prevails in the markets where there was a 
decrease in prices after a merger.
These findings suggest a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency: While 
two countries provide indicative evidence for an increase in static efficiency at the 
3 Global Wireless Matrix 1Q10. BofA Merrill Lynch.
4 Of these five mergers two reduce the number of firms from four to three (4-to-3) and three involve 
reductions from 5-to-4 firms. There were two mergers in the Netherlands: 5-to-4 and then 4-to-3; and one 
merger each in Austria, Denmark, and Greece.
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expense of less investments, the other two displayed higher investments into future 
infrastructure at the expense of higher post-merger prices.
In a narrow sense, we contribute to the literature on merger effects, especially in 
the telecommunications industry. However, our results make two broader points: (1) 
Mergers have to be assessed for their static and dynamic effects on the evolution of 
an industry; and (2) The effects of mergers are highly context-specific, even in the 
same industry.
From a policy perspective, it is also notable that competition policy may interact 
with science and technology policy in the sense that investments for infrastructure 
may be affected by competition policy instruments. This calls for an integrated view 
on these two policy aspects.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on firms’ innovation strategies 
(e.g. Coad and Rao 2008; Beneito 2003; and De Faria et al. 2010), which reiterates 
the important point that market structure affects innovation performance, but also 
suggests that the choice of partner—in our case through a merger—may be crucial 
for successful innovation.
2  Prior Literature
Merger effects have been widely studied across multiple academic fields, such as 
economics, management and finance. A significant number of economic studies 
focus on consumer welfare and find anti-competitive effects of mergers in many 
industries (e.g., McCabe 2002, in the journal market, and Dafny 2009, in the hospi-
tal market). Weinberg (2007) surveys the economics literature on this topic and finds 
that most mergers that have been examined by this literature resulted in increased 
prices, at least in the short term, which defines them as anti-competitive. Such short-
term effects of increased pricing power due to mergers are also confirmed in the 
strategy literature (e.g., Moatti et al. 2015, in global retail industry).
Further, there are a number of studies that conclude that merger-related efficien-
cies can outweigh the increase in market power, which thereby render the mergers 
pro-competitive—especially in the longer term. For instance, Focarelli and Panetta 
(2003) find that the short-term price increases that are due to mergers were followed 
by reduction of prices in the longer term in the banking industry in Italy. Also, Con-
nor et  al. (1998) show that the average costs and prices increased less for the US 
hospitals that were involved in a merger.
More generally, longer term, dynamic merger efficiencies, were often studied in 
terms of the impact of mergers on firms’ investment and innovation (Morgan 2001). 
Early economic literature on this topic—which is surveyed in  Cohen and Levin 
(1989) and  Scherer (1998)—seems largely inconclusive. More recent work in the 
management field does not yield unambiguous results that could easily be general-
ized across many sectors of the economy either (e.g., Hitt et al. 1996; Zhao 2009; 
Valentini 2012). Two explanations of the inability to find general conclusions about 
the role of mergers for dynamic efficiency are that (1) the effects may not be linear 
(Aghion et al. 2005; Cloodt et al. 2006; Sacco and Schmutzler 2011); and (2) there 
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may be substantial heterogeneity in the way dynamic efficiencies are realized across 
industries (Morgan 2001) and firms (Desyllas and Hughes 2010; Wagner 2011).
This paper adds to this literature a simultaneous analysis of static and dynamic 
efficiencies by investigating pricing and investments in the specific context of mobile 
telecoms’ mergers. This allows us, among other things, to study potential trade-offs 
between the static and dynamic efficiencies.
As observed by Morgan, “it is clear from the emerging literature on the treatment 
of competition to innovate that different issues will arise in different industrial set-
tings” (Morgan 2001, p. 182).
In our context most important dynamic efficiencies are in the area of enabling 
future innovation in various sectors of the economy using mobile telecommunica-
tions—in particular mobile internet access and data services—as inputs. The impact 
of telecommunications on innovation and economic growth is well documented (see 
e.g., Röller and Waverman 2001; Czernich et al. 2011) and can even be expected to 
grow over time, as mobile data services are increasingly enabled, in line with the 
general purpose technology paradigm (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995).
As a consequence, the measure of dynamic efficiency in our context is best cap-
tured by investment in infrastructure, rather than R&D spending (e.g.,  Hitt et  al. 
1996; Cassiman et  al. 2005; Szücs 2014), or patenting (e.g.,  Zhao 2009; Valen-
tini 2012), which are crucial in other contexts, such as the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Further, and related to this point, the dynamic merger effects in our context are 
more likely to be related to market power and/or efficiency gains (see e.g., Chatter-
jee 1986; Seth 1990) rather than transfer of knowledge (see e.g., Ahuja and Katila 
2001).
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to add to the literature on market con-
centration and investment in the telecommunication industry: which is an important 
driver of overall economy innovation and growth. By pursuing this goal we also aim 
to foster our understanding of how competition policy, which governs market con-
centration to a significant extent, may interact with science and other technology-
related policies to facilitate technological progress.
Genakos et al. (2018) in a study that is similar to ours use the Teligen dataset, 
which contains information on usage-specific tariffs for the two largest operators in 
each market,5 to investigate the impact of the industry structure on prices and capital 
expenditures. They find that an increase in market concentration leads to both higher 
prices and per-operator investment, but has no statistically significant effect on the 
investment on the market level.
The difference of our approach is that by using a dataset that is less restrictive in 
terms of the number of covered operators we are able to look at each of the cases 
separately and thus account for merger heterogeneity. On the other hand, this comes 
at a cost of having a less precise price measure. Thus our studies are complementary.
5 Teligen collects data on all tariffs of the two largest operators and computes the cost to a customer of 
hypothetical usage profiles that are essentially consumer baskets of a fixed number and duration of voice 
calls and text messages.
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There also exists some indirect empirical evidence of it from fixed-line telecom 
markets. In particular, the increase in competition from entrant telecom operators 
that was enabled by the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, was found to bring 
differentiation of service offerings (Greenstein and Mazzeo 2006) and new price 
plan introductions (Economides et al. 2008). New entry that was facilitated by the 
mandated access to European incumbent operators’ infrastructure was also shown 
to bring differentiation of broadband access speed (Nardotto et al. 2015), but lower 
investment at both the industry and the operator level (Grajek and Röller 2012).
Our analysis also follows the finance literature (Eckbo 1983; Stillman 1983) by 
allowing for differential effects of mergers on the merging parties and their indus-
try rivals. Indeed, such differential effect of mergers on prices and profitability is 
typically used to distinguish pro-competitive mergers—which are characterized 
largely by efficiency-based synergies from anti-competitive mergers—which are 
characterized largely by market power-based price increases (e.g., Duso et al. 2007; 
Clougherty and Duso 2011; Gugler and Szücs 2016). A similar approach was used 
to study the profitability of alliances (Oxley et al. 2009), responses to hostile takeo-
ver attempts (Servaes and Tamayo 2013), and the effects of mergers on R&D spend-
ing (Szücs 2014). In our context, the differential effect of mergers across firms in the 
same market allows for more precise inference about potential trade-offs between 
static and dynamic efficiencies.
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on firms’ innovation strategies. Coad 
and Rao (2008) examine the linkage between innovation and firm growth in high-
tech sectors and find that—relative to an average firm that experiences only mod-
est returns—innovation is of great importance for the fastest-growing firms. Beneito 
(2003) provides an empirical analysis of firms’ decision when choosing among R&D 
investment strategies. De Faria et al. (2010) study cooperation in innovation activi-
ties and find that the firms in the high-tech sectors, with higher levels of absorp-
tive capacity, exports and innovation intensity are more likely to cooperate in the 
innovation process and place greater value on their innovation cooperation partners. 
We show that mergers that reduce the market price pressure allow firms to focus on 
investments into long-term improvements.
3  Data
We construct our dataset by using two major sources: the Global Wireless Matrix 
dataset that is provided by Merrill Lynch (ML) and the World Cellular Information 
Service that is provided by Informa (EMC). Our dataset covers quarterly observa-
tions on 62 operators in 17 countries for the period from the last quarter of 1998 
to the second quarter of 2011. The dataset contains information on: the size of the 
customer base (the number of mobile phone users); usage intensity measured by the 
number of minutes of use; revenues; and investments. This information is used to 
construct our key variables of interest, which are listed in Table 1. The summary 
statistics are presented in Table 2.
Our first dependent variable—revenue per minute (RPM)—is calculated by 
dividing the monthly voice-only service revenues by the total minutes of use on an 
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operator’s network. Service revenues include monthly service charges and usage 
fees, roaming, long distance, and subscriptions to mobile data services, but exclude 
equipment and accessories, and are adjusted for inflation by using Eurostat’s con-
sumer price index.6 RPM is usually not disclosed by operators, but is calculated by 
Merrill Lynch, because it arguably constitutes a better proxy for pricing than the 
average revenue per user (ARPU) commonly reported by operators.7 The average 
RPM in our sample is 21.5 Euro cents and follows a downward trend over time, as 
shown in Fig. 1.
Many previous studies of the wireless telecommunications sector relied on Teli-
gen data, which are different from ours in several respects: Teligen data come in the 
form of a customer bill that corresponds to a particular usage profile (low, medium, 
high) that remains fixed over time. These expenditures are computed by picking the 
cheapest available tariff for each profile. However, these data are available only for 
the two biggest operators in each country. Therefore, our data have the advantage of 
allowing us to analyze the pricing behavior of both the merging carriers and their 
rivals. This comes at the cost of having a more coarse price measure.
Table 1  Variables’ description
Variable Explanation
RPMijt Price of carrier i in market j in period t, defined as revenue per minute (RPM), EUR
Capexijt Capital expenditure (Capex) of carrier i in the market j in period t, mln EUR
MOUijt Average minutes of use (MOU) on carrier i’s network in market j in period t, minutes
MobPenijt Number of carrier i’s users relative to country’s population in market j in period t
FixPenjt Number of fixed line users relative to country’s population in market j in period t
GDPjt GDP per capita in market j in period t, EUR
Table 2  Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. N
Revenue per minute (RPM) 0.215 0.111 0.04 1.056 2170
Capital expenditure (Capex) 82.111 86.927 1.96 764 1597
Minutes of use (MOU) 143.405 48.753 44 334 2201
Mobile penetration rate (MobPen) 0.265 0.162 0 0.823 2929
Fixed penetration rate (FixPen) 0.499 0.13 0.179 0.74 3170
GDP per capita (GDP) 28,533 11,918 5835 70,314 3145
6 Merrill Lynch admits, however, that some operators also include non-service revenues (e.g. equipment 
sales) in their revenue calculation, while others exclude revenues from roaming by pre-paid card users or 
from incoming traffic.
7 ARPU is calculated by dividing service revenues by the average subscriber base. We adopt RPM as 
our main dependent variable and use ARPU for robustness checks. The results, which are available upon 
request, are not sensitive to the price definition.
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Our second dependent variable is operator’s capital expenditure (Capex). Since 
innovation in the provision of mobile telecommunications services over the period 
of our sample was mostly driven by the increased reliability of services coupled 
with increased speed of mobile data transmission, it is well captured by the Capex: 
a close proxy for the network build-up. As is shown in Fig. 1, Capex follows a non-
linear trend over time and is highly seasonal in our sample. The Capex series that 
are reported by Merrill Lynch start only in the first quarter of 2002, which limits the 
number of observations we can use to study the operators’ investment behavior.
The average monthly usage time per user (MOU), mobile and fixed penetration 
rates, and GDP per capita serve as control variables in our analysis. MOU is calcu-
lated by dividing the total monthly usage on an operator’s network by the average 
subscriber base. It is measured in minutes and usually excludes traffic that is related 
to mobile data services, but counts both incoming and outgoing minutes of use. The 
average MOU in our sample is 143.4 min per month. It controls for changes in our 
price measures (RPM and ARPU) that result from the changing intensity of use of 
mobile phones—for instance due to fixed-mobile substitution, rather than genuine 
changes in the price plans.8 Mobile and fixed penetration rates are defined as the 
number of cellular users of a given carrier and the number of fixed-line users (or 
fixed lines) in a given country divided by that country’s population, respectively. 
The former controls for possibly different pricing strategies that are used by small 
versus large mobile network operators; e.g., penetration pricing may more often be 
used by the small operators. GDP per capita—which is routinely used as a demand 
shifter control—is adjusted for inflation by using the Eurostat’s consumer price 
index.
Fig. 1  Evolution of mobile prices and Capex, 1998–2011
8 This control is arguably more important for ARPU, which we use as a price measure in our robustness 
checks.
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In the time period of our analysis we observe five horizontal mergers.9 Table 3 
lists the analyzed mergers and reports the characteristics of the operators that were 
involved: their individual market shares (in terms of users) at the moment of the 
merger; their rank according to their size among all carriers active in the corre-
sponding national markets; the market share and the rank of the merged firm 2 years 
after the merger; and the number of the operators that remain. While there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in terms of these characteristics across cases, all mergers lead 
to substantial increases in market concentration.
4  Methodology and Results
We adopt a difference-in-difference approach to investigate differences in pricing 
and investment between the merging firms and the rest of the market. The diff-in-diff 
approach looks at changes in these differences after the merger takes place. A simi-
lar methodology, for instance, is used by McCabe (2002), who looks at the mergers 
of scientific journals. Our approach differs in that we explicitly exclude the competi-
tors in the own market from the control group to avoid contamination of the control 
group by merger spillovers. For instance, if a merger reduces the competitive rivalry 
in a given market, both the merging parties and the rivals may respond by increasing 
their prices. In the context of the wireless industry, due to the institutional and regu-
latory setup, each national market constitutes a relevant market. Thus, our control 
group consists of operators in markets where no merger took place.10
We define our pricing model as:
and
In both equations: i indicates a firm; j indicates a market and t indicates a time 
period. We write the pricing model as two separate equations to stress the fact that 
the equations are estimated using different samples: We drop all rival firms to all 
mergers when estimating (1); and we drop all merging firms when estimating (2). 
(1)
RPMijt = 훼0 + 훼1 ∗ Mergingjt + 훼2 ∗ MOUijt + 훼3 ∗ MobPenijt
+ 훼
4
∗ FixPenjt + 훼5 ∗ GDPjt + cj + 휏t + 휖ijt
(2)
RPMijt = 훽0 + 훽1 ∗ Rivaljt + 훽2 ∗ MOUijt + 훽3 ∗ MobPenijt
+ 훽
4
∗ FixPenjt + 훽5 ∗ GDPjt + dj + 휙t + 휈ijt.
9 Due to the insufficiency of data on prices, the merger in Finland that occurred during the time period 
analyzed in this study was excluded.
10 Whether that constitutes a proper comparison group depends on the plausibility of the assumption 
that, following the merger, the trend of the unobserved counterfactual would remain parallel to that of the 
control group, which in general is impossible to test. However, one indication that this requirement does 
indeed hold is the fact that both trends are parallel in the pre-merger period, which in conjunction with 
the assumption of no cross-market spillovers and no other structural change with differential impacts on 
the treatment and control groups suggests that our difference-in-difference results are reliable. A visual 
inspection of the trends suggests that this is the case (we attach the corresponding figures in "Appen-
dix 1").
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Moreover, to obtain merger-specific coefficients for each merger in our data, we esti-
mate the pricing model (1) and (2) five times: with each set of the merging firms (or 
rivals) as a separate treatment group. Estimated this way, the effects of mergers on 
merging firms [in (1)] and on rivals [in (2)] are in each case relative to the same con-
trol group: all firms in markets that did not experience a merger.
Mergingjt and Rivaljt are both dummy variables that are defined as the interac-
tion of MergerMarketj and Postmergert . MergerMarketj represents a merger mar-
ket dummy variable and is used to control for the systematic difference in prices 
between the merging (or rival) firms and the control group (firms in markets with 
no mergers). Postmergert = 1 for all periods t after the merger and otherwise 0. 
Mergingjt ( Rivaljt ) thus measures the change in the difference in prices between the 
merging firms (rivals) and the control group, subsequent to the merger. Thus, the 
coefficients on these variables represent the merger effects on the merging and rival 
firms, respectively.11
In the pricing model we also control for: the minutes of use ( MOUijt ); mobile 
user penetration ( MobPenijt ); fixed line penetration ( FixPenjt ); and GDP per cap-
ita ( GDPjt ). As was explained in the previous section, MOUijt captures an average 
volume effect, whereby users who call more minutes pay usually a lower price per 
minute. MobPenijt controls for possible effects of market dominance (measured by 
the percentage of population that is accounted for by an operator) on pricing strat-
egy. FixPenjt controls for competition from fixed-line telephony and GDPjt for shifts 
in overall demand, which both may influence mobile telephony pricing. We also 
include country dummies and time period dummies in both equations.12
To measure dynamic effects of mergers, we investigate levels of investment in 
addition to the operators’ pricing. The model’s specification is as before, except for 
the dependent variable, which is now capital expenditure:13
and
The investment model is specified analogously to the pricing model. Thus, the treat-
ment and the control groups, the main variables of interest and the control variables 
in (3) and (4) are the same as in (1) and (2). Unlike in the pricing model, however, 
(3)
Log(Capexijt) =훾0 + 훾1 ∗ Mergingjt + 훾2 ∗ MOUijt
+ 훾
3
∗ MobPenijt + 훾4 ∗ FixPenjt + 훾5 ∗ GDPjt + lj + 휆t + 휉ijt
(4)
Log(Capexijt) =훿0 + 훿1 ∗ Rivaljt + 훿2 ∗ MOUijt
+ 훿
3
∗ MobPenijt + 훿4 ∗ FixPenjt + 훿5 ∗ GDPjt + mj + 휓t + 휐ijt.
11 In order for the time series to be consistent, we generate a composite entity by averaging pre-merger 
observations, with the use of the respective market shares as weights, for the operators that merge.
12 Note that Postmergert and Mergerj are omitted from the Eqs.  (1) and (2), because the former is co-
linear with time period and the latter with the country dummy variables.
13 The log-linear specification was chosen here because the level of Capex (unlike price) depends on the 
market’s size.
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the Capex of the pre-merger entities is defined as a sum, rather than an average, of 
the Capex expenditures by the acquirer and the target.
4.1  Austria
The merger in Austria involved T-Mobile—which is owned by the German Deutsche 
Telekom and accounted for approximately 25% of the market—acquiring tele.ring: 
a price-aggressive maverick that doubled its market share in the 3 years prior to the 
merger and came to control 10% of the market. Due to its competitive behavior, tele.
ring was believed to exert more competitive pressure on its rivals than its market 
share would suggest. In its decision, the European competition authority identified 
non-coordinated effects and could not rule out coordinated effects that could result 
from the merger; but the authority cleared it subject to remedies. T-Mobile commit-
ted to sell some of its mobile sites to the other operators (in particular to H3G, the 
smallest carrier on the market that was lacking network infrastructure and frequen-
cies necessary to challenge the other operators) and either sell or return a frequency 
package.14
The estimation results for the Austrian market (Table  4) suggest that, while in 
general prices for the mobile services experienced a downward trend in the post-
merger period (see Appendix 2), post-merger prices in Austria declined also relative 
Table 4  Price and investment effects of the Austrian merger
Merging/Rival represents the treatment dummy variable: It equals 1 in the post-merger period for the 
merging firm in the Merging pane and for rival firms in the Rivals pane
*p < 0.05 ; **p < 0.01 ; ***p < 0.001
RPM Capex
Merging Rivals Merging Rivals
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Merging/Rival 0.006 0.006 − 0.061*** 0.006 − 0.297* 0.130 − 0.333** 0.123
Minutes of Use − 0.000*** 0.000 − 0.000*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
Mobile Penetration − 0.006 0.008 − 0.008 0.008 1.348*** 0.137 1.352*** 0.137
Fixed Penetration 0.035 0.022 0.033 0.022 0.762* 0.328 0.748* 0.328
GDP p.c. 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.012* 0.005 0.012* 0.005
Number of obs 1690 1691 1064 1064
F-statistic 197.238 198.790 90.220 89.294
F-test p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.867 0.871 0.808 0.808
Root MSE 0.038 0.038 0.458 0.457
14 Case No COMP/M.3916. T-MOBILE AUSTRIA/TELE.RING. Commission decision of April 26, 
2006, available at http://ec.europ a.eu/compe titio n/merge rs/cases /decis ions/m3916 _20060 426_20600 
_en.pdf.
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to the control group. These results are in line with Aguzzoni et al. (2015) that finds 
that on aggregate there was a statistically significant price decrease in the range of 
− 2% to − 20% as a result of this merger in Austria. Our results further suggest that 
the price reaction to the merger was to a larger extent driven by the rivals, as can be 
seen by the magnitude and significance of the Merging/Rival coefficient in the RPM 
equations. At the same time we find that the merger had a statistically significant 
negative effect on investment by both the merging firms and the rivals.
We thus observe a tradeoff between the static and dynamic efficiencies in the 
Austrian merger case: The lower prices that were charged by the operators after the 
merger increased the static efficiency in the market; this effect was countered by a 
drop in capital expenditures, however, which we interpret as a decrease in dynamic 
efficiency.
4.2  Denmark
In Denmark TeliaSonera—the fourth largest mobile operator—purchased the third-
ranked Orange in 2004, which led to a combined market share of around 20%. 
The merger took place in a period when Denmark already had the lowest mobile 
telephony prices in the EU, as well as one of the highest churn rates. TeliaSonera 
was ranked third after the merger and was expected to challenge the market lead-
ers—TDC and Sonofon—as TeliaSonera intended to expand its customer base 
and cut costs by closing down one of the networks. The merger was cleared by the 
Table 5  Price and investment effects of the Danish merger
Merging/Rival represents the treatment dummy: it equals 1 in the post-merger period for the merging 
firm in the Merging pane and for rival firms in the Rivals pane
*p < 0.05 ; **p < 0.01 ; ***p < 0.001
RPM Capex
Merging Rivals Merging Rivals
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Merging/Rival 0.073*** 0.012 0.060*** 0.008 0.470*** 0.130 0.310** 0.103
Minutes of Use − 0.000*** 0.000 − 0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001
Mobile Penetration − 0.008 0.008 − 0.010 0.008 1.349*** 0.137 1.366*** 0.135
Fixed Penetration 0.020 0.022 0.008 0.021 0.526 0.317 0.412 0.326
GDP p.c. 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.005
Number of obs 1678 1729 1064 1094
F-statistic 165.963 166.209 106.491 99.693
F-test p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.863 0.861 0.822 0.813
Root MSE 0.038 0.038 0.459 0.458
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competition authorities, as it did not appear to create or strengthen a dominant posi-
tion, nor pose any other threat to effective competition in the Danish market for 
mobile telephony.15
Following the merger, there was a general price increase for both the merging 
firms and their rivals in Denmark (Table 5). The effect was stronger for the merger 
participants (7.3 cents) than for their rivals (6.0 cents). Note that while the merger in 
Denmark was technically 5-to-4, the fifth competitor, 3 (Hutchison), only accounted 
for 1% of the market (in fact, in its analysis of the case, the EU Commission 
describes this as a four-entity market), and the change in concentration was in the 
nature of a 4-to-3 merger.
The Capex results imply that both merging firms and their rivals significantly 
increase investment spending after the merger. Thus, the Danish merger results also 
indicate a tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiencies; while Danish operators 
raised prices after the merger, they also increased infrastructure investments.
4.3  Netherlands
In 2005, the incumbent and market leader KPN acquired Telfort (which was ranked 
3rd at that time). While the merged entity was expected to account for about 50% 
of the market, the merger was cleared unconditionally by the Dutch competition 
Table 6  Price and investment effects of the first Dutch merger
Merging/Rival represents the treatment dummy variable: it equals 1 in the post-merger period for the 
merging firm in the Merging pane and for rival firms in the Rivals pane
*p < 0.05 ; **p < 0.01 ; ***p < 0.001
RPM Capex
Merging Rivals Merging Rivals
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Merging/rival − 0.004 0.005 0.026*** 0.006 0.275* 0.122 0.294* 0.123
Minutes of use − 0.000*** 0.000 − 0.000*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
Mobile penetration − 0.007 0.008 − 0.005 0.008 1.349*** 0.137 1.388*** 0.137
Fixed penetration 0.033 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.799* 0.328 0.619 0.323
GDP p.c. 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.012* 0.005 0.010* 0.005
Number of obs 1690 1733 1051 1098
F-statistic 186.655 172.148 87.087 89.378
F-test p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.867 0.866 0.807 0.800
Root MSE 0.038 0.038 0.457 0.463
15 Case No COMP/M.3530. TELIASONERA AB/ORANGE A/S. Commission decision of September 
24, 2004, available at http://ec.europ a.eu/compe titio n/merge rs/cases /decis ions/m3530 _en.pdf.
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authority on the grounds that the remaining three operators in the Netherlands—one 
of the few remaining countries with five carriers at that time–were all subsidiaries of 
strong international players capable to exert sufficient competitive pressure to pre-
vent the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
The Dutch market then experienced the second merger in 2007, when T-Mobile 
acquired Orange. The European Commission concluded that Orange was not a price 
maverick, as it was mostly active in the prepaid segment—unlike the rest of the car-
riers—and was not seen as a close substitute to T-Mobile. Nor was a collective dom-
inant position by the three remaining operators expected to be a likely threat.
The case of the Netherlands is unique in our study in that its market was exposed 
to two successive mergers. This is interesting from the perspective of the commonly 
stated hypothesis that 4-to-3 mergers are significantly more harmful than 5-to-4 
mergers (see, e.g., Csorba 2015).
It is important to mention that the analysis is somewhat complicated in the case 
of the Netherlands: Identifying the merger effects here is more problematic due to 
the overlap of the pre- and post-merger periods, as the close succession of the sec-
ond merger (approximately 2 years after the first one) makes it difficult to disentan-
gle the effects of each event.
The results that we report for the Dutch market (Tables  6, 7)   suggest that the 
effect on investment was substantially more pronounced, as is evidenced by statisti-
cally significant (albeit only at the 10% level) and positive coefficients for both the 
merging firms and the rivals for both mergers, while for price we observe only an 
increase in the rivals’ prices following the first merger. These results are robust to 
modifying the definitions of pre- and post-merger periods between the two mergers; 
Table 7  Price and investment effects of the second Dutch merger
Merging/Rival represents the treatment dummy variable: It equals 1 in the post-merger period for the 
merging firm in the Merging pane and for rival firms in the Rivals pane
*p < 0.05 ; **p < 0.01 ; ***p < 0.001
RPM Capex
Merging Rivals Merging Rivals
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Merging/Rival − 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.373* 0.176 0.293* 0.146
Minutes of Use − 0.000*** 0.000 − 0.000*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
Mobile Penetration 0.017* 0.007 0.006 0.007 1.377*** 0.158 1.351*** 0.151
Fixed Penetration 0.024 0.031 0.027 0.030 1.107 0.640 1.107 0.636
GDP p.c. 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.011* 0.006 0.010 0.006
Number of obs 817 839 728 741
F-statistic 184.900 177.615 113.049 112.731
F-test p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.826 0.826 0.831 0.827
Root MSE 0.019 0.019 0.423 0.423
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but due to the aforementioned constraints, there is not too much room for resetting 
the date in the alternative specifications.
Thus, we again observe some trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies—
at least for the first merger, where an increase in the prices of the rivals was accom-
panied by a higher level of the investment expenditures. But the exact distinction 
between the effects of the first and the second merger is difficult in the Dutch case.
4.4  Greece
In Greece, TIM Hellas—the third largest operator—acquired Q-Telecommunication: 
the youngest and the smallest entity in the market. TIM Hellas continued to be the 
third-largest operator after the merger. Even though the merger led to a reduction in 
the number of carriers from four to three, it was not expected to raise competition 
concerns, as Q-Telecom was not regarded as a price maverick, and, moreover, it was 
expected that TIM Hellas would compete more actively with the two large incum-
bents. The EU competition authority approved the merger.16
The estimated merger effect on prices in Greece was unambiguously nega-
tive (Table  8): both for the merging operators and their rivals. This result can be 
explained by the fact that, in line with the market description above, having acquired 
a larger share of the post-merger market, the third-ranked operator switched to a 
Table 8  Price and investment effects of the Greek merger
Merging/Rival represents the treatment dummy variable: It equals 1 in the post-merger period for the 
merging firm in the Merging pane and for rival firms in the Rivals pane
*p < 0.05 ; **p < 0.01 ; ***p < 0.001
RPM Capex
Merging Rivals Merging Rivals
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Merging/Rival − 0.109*** 0.017 − 0.119*** 0.018 − 0.027 0.263 − 0.169 0.175
Minutes of Use − 0.000*** 0.000 − 0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001
Mobile Penetration − 0.007 0.008 − 0.021** 0.008 1.352*** 0.137 1.337*** 0.132
Fixed Penetration 0.015 0.023 − 0.018 0.025 0.751* 0.326 0.928** 0.324
GDP p.c. 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.012* 0.005 0.013* 0.005
Number of obs 1684 1722 1050 1078
F-statistic 165.946 165.057 89.312 87.942
F-test p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.868 0.860 0.810 0.804
Root MSE 0.039 0.042 0.459 0.460
16 Case No COMP/M.4036. TPG IV/APAX/Q-TELECOM. Commission decision of January 13, 2006, 
available at http://ec.europ a.eu/compe titio n/merge rs/cases /decis ions/m4036 _20060 113_20310 _en.pdf.
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more aggressive behavior to challenge the two big entities and gain a larger share—
which at the same time triggered a symmetric response by the incumbents.
While the prices clearly decreased after the merger, the estimated coefficients 
from the Capex equations are negative but not statistically significant. Thus, the 
Greek merger neither supports nor refutes the hypothesized tradeoff between static 
and dynamic efficiencies.
4.5  Summary of the Merger Results
Overall, the estimation results suggest that—while most of the wireless markets 
experienced a decrease in prices over the corresponding period—this effect was sof-
tened by weaker competition in some markets that were exposed to mergers. In three 
out of the five mergers that we analyze, weaker competition led to higher prices that 
were charged by the merging firms In two cases, however—in Austria and Greece—
mergers led to a further decrease in the prices of the merging firms and/or rivals. 
This can be explained at least to some extent by the specificities of these mergers. In 
the Austrian case—thanks to the remedies attached to the merger—H3G (the small-
est carrier in the market) was significantly strengthened by acquiring that network 
infrastructure and frequencies that it needed to challenge the other operators. In the 
Greek case, the third-largest operator was also significantly strengthened by acquir-
ing the fourth-largest one.
Further, our results suggest a positive relation between the estimated effects of 
mergers on prices and on investment. In all four of the markets that we studied, 
the direction of the effects on prices and investments was the same: Higher prices 
coincide with higher investment, and lower prices with lower investment.17 This 
suggests that the effect of mergers on consumer welfare extends beyond the price 
changes and includes, among others, dynamic effects that result from higher levels 
of investments. These dynamic effects also need to be given proper consideration in 
the merger evaluation process. In the case of mobile telecommunications market in 
Europe, all mergers over the last 2 decades resulted in efficiencies, either static or 
dynamic, but never both at the same time. Moreover, the static and dynamic efficien-
cies seem to be negatively correlated, which poses a difficult dilemma for merger 
policy.
As discussed before, we test the validity of our results by inspecting the pre-
merger price and investment paths and checking whether they exhibit common 
trends. In addition, we plot the residuals from the price regressions with the use 
of the the same set of controls in the pre-merger period and examine whether the 
prices follow similar trends conditional on the covariates in our model. These fig-
ures (Appendix 2) largely justify our approach.
17 One possible mechanism for our result that prices and investment move in the same direction is that 
investment simply gets more attractive if prices and therefore profit opportunities are higher. Another 
possibility is that telecom companies are financially constrained; when prices increase, they have the 
funds to undertake investments that they would have made earlier, but could not finance (see Hall 1995).
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We performed further robustness checks where we included additional controls, 
such as the share of pre-paid customers, fixed line prices, and time since the entry 
into the market. We also used different definitions of the merger date to account for 
the fact that the time period between the announcement of the intention to merge 
and the actual legal, corporate, and marketing changes can span several quarters. 
However, we find similar effects.
We also estimated specifications where the post-merger period is split in two 
parts: 2  years immediately after the merger and the subsequent years. First, this 
allows us to analyze how fast the effect is building up. Second, it could serve as an 
additional validation check, as the potential deviations in the short-term estimates 
from the overall results would suggest that the overall effect could possibly have 
been driven by factors that were unrelated to the merger.
We report the results in Appendix  3, where the dummy variables Merging08/
Rival08 and Merging8+/Rival8+ are defined in an analogous way to Merging/Rival, 
except that they take the value 1 only in the first eight quarters after the merger and 
only after the first eight quarters after the merger, correspondingly. As the overall 
effects are similar, in both the short and long term, with the latter being larger in 
absolute value in most cases, we conclude that the obtained estimates are consistent 
with the assumption that the effect accumulates over time as the merging firms com-
plete the consolidation and restructuring processes and their rivals internalize those 
processes in their responses.
5  Conclusion
We conducted an ex-post evaluation of five domestic horizontal mergers in the 
European wireless sector. These markets can be characterized as: national in scope; 
displaying large market concentration; and in need of large sunk investments. Thus, 
they represent an ideal testing ground for an ex-post evaluation of merger effects on 
static and dynamic efficiencies. The evidence from the Netherlands and Denmark 
supports the conventional wisdom of mergers being associated with a higher price 
level for consumers. Thus, we provide evidence that no two mergers are the same, 
and although post-merger price increases often occur, many other factors that reflect 
the particular setting in which a merger takes place and the specifics of each case 
have to be accounted for. In particular, the Austrian and Greek cases suggest that 
strengthening small firms by either allowing them to merge or imposing appropriate 
remedies in a merger process may lead to downward pressure on prices.
Focusing on the effects of mergers on prices alone, however, ignores important 
issues, such as changes in product choice and service quality that can have a mitigat-
ing effect on consumer welfare. Particularly, the growth in data services has become 
an important feature of the services that have been offered by mobile carriers over 
the last decade with associated requirements of huge sunk capital expenditures. 
Therefore, we analyze both price and the investment effects of mergers: We examine 
the issue of whether there is a trade-off between static (i.e. price) and dynamic (i.e. 
investment) efficiency.
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We find that for the five mergers under scrutiny, prices and investment move in 
the same direction: For those mergers where we find a dominance of market power 
effects (Netherlands and Denmark), we also find significant increases in investment 
spending post-merger. For mergers where we find a preponderance of cost efficiency 
(Austria and Greece), we do not find significant increases in post-merger investment 
spending. Thus, we find evidence of a trade-off between static and dynamic efficien-
cies in mergers in a large sunk cost industry.
The fact that mergers do not uniformly lead to an increase or decrease in prices, 
but that investments more in the same direction as prices suggests a powerful link 
between the two: While the specificities of each merger may lead to different out-
comes overall, the tradeoff between static and dynamic efficiency remains.
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics
See Tables 9 and 10.
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Appendix 2: Common Trends
The key assumption that underlies the validity of the difference-in-difference 
approach is that the outcome of interest in the treatment and control groups would 
follow the same time trend in the absence of treatment. While it is generally dif-
ficult to ascertain whether this assumption holds, one way to do it—which has 
been previously suggested in the literature (see, e.g., Hastings 2004)—is simply 
visually to inspect both trends in the pre-treatment period: If they appear to be 
parallel (the means, of course, do not have to be the same), one would hope that 
Table 9  Summary statistics by country
Country N obs RPM Capex N firms Minutes of 
use
Mobile Pen. Fixed Pen. GDP p.c.
Austria 227 0.231 32.397 3.890 151.332 0.254 0.448 32,631
Belgium 153 0.180 37.485 2.941 137.8064 0.270 0.462 31,155
Czech Repub-
lic
165 0.180 30.052 2.855 107.9457 0.325 0.298 10,871
Denmark 240 0.184 20.094 4.233 161.5359 0.233 0.603 41,036
France 153 0.181 212.581 3.000 229.8033 0.230 0.579 30,145
Germany 204 0.256 156.514 3.980 99.01981 0.222 0.647 29,935
Greece 189 0.290 37.269 3.212 121.1627 0.309 0.498 19,419
Hungary 153 0.168 21.432 2.843 150.2849 0.272 0.337 10,369
Italy 204 0.203 184.250 3.627 126.7617 0.303 0.433 26,374
Netherlands 255 0.237 44.134 4.196 141.9986 0.213 0.517 33,046
Norway 120 0.207 25.252 2.600 198.6554 0.368 0.526 55,160
Poland 171 0.214 58.421 3.398 99.12053 0.199 0.281 7814
Portugal 153 0.201 38.558 3.000 125.6226 0.356 0.408 15,362
Spain 181 0.214 112.540 3.420 145.8192 0.261 0.439 23,564
Sweden 204 0.210 19.679 3.647 158.7789 0.274 0.645 35,187
Switzerland 153 0.271 45.063 2.902 116.7843 0.307 0.700 43,161
United King-
dom
250 0.216 147.779 4.580 160.7919 0.208 0.569 35,106
Total (N obs)/
Mean
3175 0.215 82.111 3.542 143.405 0.265 0.499 28,533
Table 10  Market concentration before/after the merger
HHI before ΔHHI HHI 1 year after HHI 2 years after
Austria 3008 272 3219 3233
Denmark 3372 240 3593 3618
Netherlands 1 2374 1070 3423 3465
Netherlands 2 3465 361 3726 3772
Greece 3112 275 3396 3382
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the control group’s post-treatment path would also be parallel to the unobserved 
counterfactual.
One must also keep in mind that, in order for that to hold, the intervention 
should not influence the units in the control group. In our context, a domestic 
mobile carrier merger in a given market should not influence the outcomes in 
other countries. We expect this to be the case due to the fact that wireless markets 
in Europe are rather distinct because of the still national regulatory structure.
Below we depict the price and investments paths of RPM and Capex, which 
are observed over the timespan that is available in our dataset in the treatment 
(the merging firm) and control groups (the average across all operators in the 
countries where no merger took place). In addition, we also account for the possi-
bility that—even if not parallel in general—the price and investment trends could 
still be parallel conditional on a set of regressors: Including these regressors then 
in the main model would prevent it from being invalidated based on the pre-treat-
ment trends divergence. Therefore, we also plot the residuals from the regressions 
that are based on the same specification as in our merger effects model.
Merging
See Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Fig. 2  Austria
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Fig. 3  Denmark
Fig. 4  Netherlands
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Rivals
See Figs. 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Fig. 5  Greece
Fig. 6  Austria. Rivals
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Fig. 7  Denmark. Rivals
Fig. 8  Netherlands. Rivals
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Appendix 3: Short‑ and Long‑Term Effects
See Table 11.
Fig. 9  Greece. Rivals
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